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The Postcolonial Arctic  
MICHAEL BRAVO 
 
Introduction 
In 1996, the distinguished Princeton-Toronto historian, Natalie Zemon Davis, 
identified four approaches which resonate generally as key strategies in postcolonial 
analysis: 1) To analyse the European gaze to reveal dominant western attitudes 
towards non-European peoples; 2) To privilege ‘indigenous peoples and Europeans as 
both actors and reactants’ and ‘to construct accounts of their relations in terms of the 
polarities of hegemony and resistance’; 3) To focus on the middle ground, a hybrid or 
third space of exchange and mixing, and; 4) To follow the paths of material objects 
(e.g. indigenous maps, memory sticks [sic], or wumpum belts) through the material 
culture of the middle ground to reveal complex processes of autoethnography.1  
While living amidst polarities and dialectics can be very productive, Zemon 
Davis also counsels us to move ‘beyond polarities’, the second strategy framed as 
encounters between alternative or incommensurable worlds. Although she warmly 
acknowledges the rich insights to be gained by comparing methods of Europeans with 
those of ‘Others’, she sees the limitations of treating multiple knowledge systems as 
though they simply emanate from singular epistemic communities without shaping 
each other across different spatial and temporal scales. Hence she directs us towards 
the middle ground of exchange in which complex identities, shaped by material 
forces near and far, are reformed in important and often unexpected ways. 
The injunction to go beyond the ‘critical encounters’ paradigm that achieved 
theoretical prominence in the early 1990s around the work of Mary Louise Pratt’s 
Imperial Eyes, Tzvetan Todorov, and others, reflected on the historicity of the 
watershed events of 1992, coinciding as it did with divergent responses in Europe and 
the Americas towards the treatment of the quincentenary of Columbus’ expeditions to 
the New World. At the time, the social and political tensions and currents in the 
Americas reverberated through the human sciences. ‘500 years, yes, but of what?’ 
asked critics. What should be commemorated, how, and by whom? Fuelled by the 
African-American civil rights movement of the 1960s, the environmental movements 
born in the 1970s, and indigenous political governance organisations that emerged in 
the same period, waves of anger and outrage were reflected in many postcolonial 
literatures. Further afield, historical writing from the Asian subcontinent and different 
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regions within Africa contributed to a crisis for received historiography around the 
history of European expansion and the relationship between expert knowledge and 
global capital.  
The collective challenge in the early 1990s was to reshape historical practice 
to ‘decentre’ the hegemony of western knowledge in the form of maritime navigation 
and landscape. While many American intellectuals were celebrating Fukuyama’s The 
End of History, basking in the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, then-early career environmental historians such as Mary Terrall, Richard Grove, 
Richard Drayton and myself were interrogating the figures of the surveyor, botanist, 
explorer, and colonial administrator. In his study of George Everest Matthew Edney 
cited Margaret Thatcher as Everest’s reason for leaving Britain, which was then in the 
grip of the worst recession since the Great Depression. This was the setting which 
gave the framework of ‘encounters’ an immense poignancy, when the need for 
decentring had a sense of intense urgency about it. It reflected a world that was 
deeply polarised. In this article, I ask what the resonances are of ‘decentring’ in how 
we understand the Arctic today. 
 
Mapping pasts 
Somewhat recklessly, I embarked in 1988 on writing a doctoral thesis concerning the 
history of encounters— as told from both sides, as it were. I was inspired by the 
extraordinary oral traditions testifying to the technical navigation skills possessed by 
Inuit Elders in Northern Canada. These traditional methods of navigation were 
regularly practiced across the network of trails spanning thousands of kilometres of 
sea ice, and thus the challenge I set myself was to tell the story of Arctic 
exploration—its longitude and navigation— by traveling with Inuit to understand 
their perspectives, while also developing a serious engagement with the history of 
Britain’s maritime empire. 
 
Figure 1. Iligliuk’s chart of the Arctic Seas 
 
Although the names of the Inuit champions of sea ice and longitude and Ikiq (large 
strait of water), may not be well known to many people outside the region, educating 
and encouraging audiences to imagine the geography of Canada’s Arctic archipelago 
going beyond the hegemonic mapping of the Northwest Passage has remained one of 
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my long term goals. To that end, in 2014 I launched with partners Claudio Aporta and 
Fraser Taylor at the Geomatics Research Centre at Carleton University in Canada a 
new online atlas of Inuit trails based on maps drawn by Inuit—revealing different 
kinds of autoethnography and power relations—to illustrate how trails connected 
between Inuit peoples from coast to coast, and to show how this impressive network 
of trails spanned the North American continent like an aboriginal songlines map for 
the top of North America. 
 
Figure 2: The Pan-Inuit Trails Atlas.2 
 
This digital atlas (Figure 2) poses questions about its postcolonial sensibilities. In 
what senses are Inuit voices represented in this digital cartographic performance? The 
project continues to reflect to some extent the polarized values of states and citizens 
in the 1980s folded into open source technologies of the 2000s as supported by 
Google. New and old colonialisms, changing colonialisms, can be hard to distinguish. 
Travelling with Inuit friends was my inspiration; in that culture which prizes 
tolerance and patience, I was sometimes identified with Parrisee, the person and 
occasionally Parry, the legacy. Being identified with the protagonist one studies is a 
thorny, if not uncommon, problem for historians. There were, however, many 
historiographical resources to draw on for investigating comparative modes of 
engagement. French historical anthropology was key here because the pioneer of 
Arctic sociology, Marcel Mauss, invented the theory of gift exchange. So, too, there 
were new and important tools for decentring longitude in the work of Bruno 
Latour/Louis Pasteur (Paris), Marshall Sahlins/James Cook (Chicago). In being 
Parry, I was in distinguished company. 
I remember fondly the occasion in 1996 when I was introduced to Mario 
Aupilarjuk, a very distinguished Inuit elder from Rankin Inlet on the west coast of 
Hudson Bay. I was very excited because my Inuk friend, Bernadette Dean, herself a 
leader in pursuing issues of justice relating to youth, elders and gender, had been 
preparing me to meet someone very special. In the Inuit tradition, we visited 
Aupilarjuk for tea at his home. It was indeed an honour. He told me that he had been 
looking forward to meeting me and had a question, which we might try to repeat here 
as an imaginative thought experiment. Prefacing his question by observing that I had 
spent many years at famous universities (Edinburgh, Manchester, Cambridge), he 
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asked me simply and earnestly, ‘What is the most important thing you have learned 
there?’ The moment had a rare intensity that comes when someone’s attention is 
given in its entirety to you as its focus, the uncanny experience of being listened to. 
A sense of calling, attentiveness, urgency and exchange are fundamental 
notions to consider in the analysis of a postcolonial Arctic. Questioning one’s 
personal and theoretical orientation has been recognised by many postcolonial 
scholars (e.g. Rosaldo, Clifford) as being critical to the enterprise because doing so 
involves a reappraisal of the shared ground on which we stand as knowing subjects. It 
could be argued that it is a necessary condition for a full engagement with the 
complex braiding of historical strands and experiences that is the material life of 
postcolonial methods. Postcolonial analysis is work, and usually difficult work. 
Braiding is gendered in interesting ways. On the one hand it is a practice 
associated with weaving of hair more often by women (though also by men). On the 
other hand, it is integral to the way that ropes, or sheets as sailors call them, are 
formed and spliced. In each case, braiding creates strength, shape and texture out of 
discrete plies of yarn, which in turn are comprised of fibres. I want to suggest that 
braiding in the Inuit world is neither simply about being at home (domestic) or about 
life on the trail (hunting), and that this digital Inuit atlas displays a network of braided 
trails (c.f. Ingold 2013, Turnbull 2000). An example (Figure 3) from a mapping 
workshop will illustrate this. 
 
Figure 3. Pond Inlet Elders mapping together 
 
During one of my journeys to the field, Annie Paingut Peterloosie (c.1940—2012) 
from Pond Inlet told me about the difficult days when as a teenager she was promised 
to a young man, but wanted to marry another. In fact things turned out as she had 
hoped, and she married the man she wanted. Because her husband’s father was a 
great hunter, Annie (Figure 4) travelled many thousands of kilometres of trails while 
she was still a young woman, and the journeys she remembered and drew were of 
course the shared experience of a family group. 
She also remembered at age three, travelling in the winter down the coast 
from Igloolik to Repulse Bay (Aivilik). Her body carried and protected by her 
mother’s amauti, her head was raised up just enough for her eyes to scan the horizon. 
One is never too young (or too old) to look at and to learn of the landscape’s detailed 
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secrets. Her particular pleasure was seeing a herd of caribou for the first time, a 
memory so enduring and etched with feeling that she asked her family to take her 
back to that spot in her later years – which they did, much to her delight. Annie is 
remembered by many who knew her in Pond Inlet for her work as a teacher, a well of 
support and love for those in her midst. Her humility and orientation towards the 
needs of others was recognisable in the calmness and joy of her presence – in a way 
that had nothing to do with romanticism. It was something more to do with a sense of 
belonging tied up with movement and change, self-knowledge that doesn’t stand still 
or eulogise the past. I understand she is greatly missed. 
 
Figure 4. Annie Paingut Peterloosie  
 
Now is a strange time for northern peoples and places – changing weather patterns 
and much more uncertainty besides. More and more books are being written about the 
Arctic’s future – its new norths, new investments, new uncontrolled events – and a 
stream of other new imperatives, geopolitical discourses tinged with prophecy about 
what will be and could not be otherwise. This feels like the era of a new wave of 
experts who have come in a hurry and have a lot to say. When I sit in on international 
governance meetings, I sometimes remember the Avett Brothers song ‘Ten Thousand 
Words’ where they sing ‘ain’t it like most people are no different, we like to talk on 
things we don’t know about’. This futurology, a form of political economy following 
the narrative of commodity-driven colonialism, represents an important but different 
understanding of historical braiding: a cacophony of voices linked to capital, finance 
and industry like the old trading floor of the Chicago stock exchange, now hollowed 
out and dominated by computer algorithms trading with each other. In the Arctic, 
where once there was historical memory, there is now a theatre of auctioneers, stock 
tickers, and complex financial instruments like credit default swaps and sub-prime 
investments carving out new voids. If the Arctic’s political economy and political 
ecology have arguably acquired new complexity over the past decade, we should ask 
whether this is the result of maturing political settlements or the entrenchment of new 
polarities on top of old. 
For example, Iceland’s major banks went into receivership during the 
financial crisis of 2008 because their hedge funds got out of their depth in selling 
derivatives of complex financial products. Anthropologist Neils Einarsson has argued 
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that the extraordinary derivatives accumulation was only made possible because the 
country’s future fish stock quotas were used as collateral for these enormous 
derivatives products.3 With important exceptions in the urban centres of Alaska and 
northern Scandinavia – northern cities are becoming evermore important for the 
future of the circumpolar region – most northern regions have tiny tax bases and 
levels of debt that keep the bailiffs at bay only because of sustained state 
interventions. Yet nearly two decades ago, Harvard sociologist Colin Irwin diagnosed 
the structural inequalities that keep the majority of people inhabiting northern 
resource peripheries in a state of unequal life opportunities and health indicators.4 
This, he argued, was a fork in the road and for all that there had been significant 
devolution, welfare dependency was the road taken. This hasn’t changed for the 
simple reason that the structural inequalities where the wealth and energy flow in 
southerly directions, suits states, corporations and shareholders very well. 
Not everyone is poor of course; many people contribute to the service 
economy who are highly skilled, and some are highly educated. The Inupiat North 
slope borough of Alaska is said to be amongst the richest municipalities in the whole 
of the USA, as their stake in resource revenues has made them very wealthy. But this 
is in large part evidence of the growing disparity of wealth and power in resource 
peripheries. Not for nothing has the Arctic been dubbed the ‘global South’ in the 
North, as researchers look to Nigeria or South Africa for fertile comparisons. The 
Arctic is now very clearly part of the same world in which the richest eighty-five 
people have as much wealth as the poorest fifty percent (four and a half billion).5 
 
Braiding narratives 
In order to be able to hear and listen to new braided narratives of hope in the Arctic, I 
think we need to employ postcolonial strategies that articulate responses to neo-
colonial polarities while not forgetting the basic tools for understanding traditional 
colonialism. We need to allow northern voices, human and non-human, to be heard; 
but there is also an urgent need to have greater distance from the dominant discursive 
framings of the most powerful actors. It is no accident that governance forums in the 
UK are disciplined in Foucault’s sense, and that postcolonial scholars are considered 
out of place. The UK’s Arctic anthropologists are considered too awkward and are 
rarely invited to these discussions in spite of being the country’s most experienced 
	 	
	 7	
authorities on Arctic political economy. There is no room for doubt that the Arctic is 
a seriously contested field where states are vying to redefine its hierarchies. 
Strategies are needed that are much better grounded in historical 
understanding across a range of spatial, temporal and cultural registers; too much 
writing about the Arctic today is ahistorical and short-sighted while proclaiming a 
capacity for future vision. Strategies are needed—social economy à la Ash Amin or 
Frances Abele comes to mind as one such useful tack—to highlight the conditions in 
which public policy, particularly education, can succeed in building capacity in small 
rural communities and in the growing urban settings. Paolo Freire has argued that 
education is at the heart of building postcolonial consciousness, and that decolonising 
ourselves is close to the heart of what grounds postcolonial desire and enables it to be 
harnessed productively.6 Linking our research to create collaborative educational 
resources from primary school level through university level should be prioritised as 
an opportunity where our work can have some of its greatest impact. 
Postcolonial strategies need to be far more transnational in and beyond the 
Arctic, reaching out to the likes of Latin America, Australia, New Zealand, Southern 
Africa. This necessitates a certain distancing from political centres, risking 
unpopularity, for example, to come closer to the aims of liberation theology, which 
lie in seeking ‘solidarity with the poor’.7  The Arctic as it exists discursively – a 
wonderfully rich, cooperative environment largely shared by developed nations 
working collaboratively with northern peoples – is fracturing under pressures that are 
both internal and external. The kind of postcolonial analytical strategies needed must 
be sufficiently grounded in northern settings but distanced from the present political 
constitution of elites in order to survive the current political transformation, to seek a 
situated sense of place and hope in the fractured and fragmenting high latitudes on 
which global Arctic visions are projected.  
Perhaps one might contemplate the idea of a ‘post-Arctic’. One interpretation 
of this is an analytical space that distances itself from the excesses and residues of 
commodity cycles that have been part of the waves of northward capitalist expansion 
since the sixteenth century. To paraphrase Latour, if we have never been ‘Arctic’, 
then why should we be compelled to subscribe to Arctic modernism today with its 
clichéd and wrongheaded polarities of traditional/modern, local/global, 
nature/culture, human/animal.8 We know that these dichotomies grossly distort the 
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fabric of our human and non-human ecologies. To understand how we might inhabit 
the post-Arctic, let us explore what assumptions and values it challenges. 
To some extent, that is what the articles in this issue of Moving Worlds do, 
posing concise questions about both the Arctic’s postcolonial past and its neo-
colonial present. Taking a leaf out of other postcolonial studies, what we see in the 
Arctic today—including indigenous political devolution in its different forms such as 
Greenland’s multi-party devolution—is not so much postcolonial as a set of strategies 
of containment on the part of Arctic states, playing out a set of historical processes of 
nation-building in which the aboriginal title of northern peoples continues to pose 
awkward and uncomfortable questions to the metropolitan majority. This particular 
group’s economic dependence on primary resource economy is mediated by identities 
in which northern ecologies and the growing poor are largely rendered invisible, 
romanticised or ‘other’—and accordingly displaced to the margins of national 
consciousness. 
When I first trained as a project engineer some thirty-five years ago, I visited 
Arctic military camps, visited Inuit communities, discussed issues with highly 
educated government advisors (including now friends), and spent hundreds of hours 
in libraries and archives. Rarely can I remember occasions when power was devolved 
with commensurate resources; what is devolved is wrapped in the rhetoric of 
generosity and equality, and only acknowledges historic injustice and rights when 
required by courts of law. States have been opportunistic in devolving authority tied 
to conditions of debt —Greenland is no exception. What appears to be a paradox in 
fact displays remarkable consistency: that northern states during the peak or boom 
phases of commodity cycles are highly centralised and increasingly so; take 
contemporary Norway, for example. In this context, political devolution to northern 
constituencies involves a process of spatial and territorial practices whose aim is to 
enclose and regulate the commons for private capital. The record of devolution has all 
too often proved to entrench inequality, pouring cold water on aspirations for 
autonomy. Sharing common certain features with the international aid industry, this 
generates neocolonial dependence that sustains the new elites, a debate that takes 
James Ferguson’s Anti-Politics Machine as its point of departure.9 
Still, postcolonial opportunities may occupy what Homi Bhabha and others 
have called the interstices of these national spaces and state institutions – third 
spaces. Legions of researchers with master’s or doctoral degrees (who tend to be 
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more or less liberal) are the labour force of government policy makers and 
consultants who create and maintain northern policies of this kind. Even my own 
institution, Cambridge University’s Scott Polar Research Institute, whose original 
building was designed by Herbert Baker—architect to Lutyens and Cecil Rhodes—is 
no exception. Our institutions are difficult places to cultivate being post-Arctic. Many 
of our graduates are contracted to governments, research institutes or consultancies 
that regulate or mediate oil and gas development, mineral development, and 
environmental assessment. A good number of these graduates have written 
wonderful, insightful and inspiring dissertations about indigenous cultures, strategies 
of negotiation and resistance, resource co-management, and community-based 
governance. But the research economy is very closely tied to policies of resource 
development and is funded by states working closely with multinational corporations 
– variously benign and malevolent depending on the situation and one’s perspective. 
Do young scholars think about the relationship between the kinds of livelihood that 
brought them into their field of research and the kinds of livelihood they will be 
seeking once they have finished? What future do they envisage once they become 
known as Arctic experts or polar scientists? We don’t talk about this enough, and we 
should.  
 
 
Big issues, big places: The Arctic, the global and comparative colonialism 
 
What does it mean to be involved in postcolonial Arctic studies when the foundations 
of its regional identity are starting to fracture under new constellations of 
globalisation? When according to the region’s most distinguished political scientist, 
Oran Young, the region is experiencing an unprecedented ‘state change’?10 We must 
keep in mind this narrative of ‘state change’ – marked by climate change, the melting 
of sea ice, shifts in ecosystems, and globalisation marked by new political actors from 
eastern Asia. While the ‘state change’ claim has influence beyond its clear reference 
to the politics of global warming, it is very difficult to pin down what this claim 
actually entails, and how it speaks a mainstream liberal political ecology.  
Part of the challenge for postcolonial researchers is to understand why we 
once imagined the Arctic to be fundamentally different from the rest of the world – 
how we were suckered by the appeal of Arctic exceptionalism. Northern politicians 
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and researchers alike have enjoyed a love affair with the narrative of circumpolar 
cooperation around environmental concern; perestroika and the melting of Cold War 
international relations; the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(1991) and the intergovernmental Arctic Council (1996) with its inclusive role for 
Permanent Participants and its more cautious status for Permanent Observers.  
In the mid-1990s, poststructuralist political theorists like Monica Tennberg in 
Finland were already drawing on the work of Foucault to examine Arctic governance 
in EU states in relation to Foucault’s account of liberal governmentality. The 
Foucauldian critique is today more important than ever because of three related major 
trends that have been changing the Arctic: 1) securitisation; 2) the enclosure and 
shrinking of the commons; and 3) its commodification and digitisation (see Williams, 
this issue). Land, shelf and seabed are being relentlessly surveyed and measured, with 
an eye to assigning future exclusive rights of access or ownership. States, 
multinational corporations, and environmental organisations are all competing to 
enclose new territory at an unprecedented rate. Issuing leaseholds and title 
documents, streamlining environmental assessment, and corporate tax incentives on 
foreign investment are all examples of familiar instruments that, as John Agnew has 
argued, redistribute and outsource sovereignty whilst proclaiming to electorates that 
national sovereignties are being defended.11 These instruments are necessary for 
multinational frontier capitalism to act in the backyard of G8 nations whose citizens 
seek reassurance that the nation’s imagined territorial integrity remains intact. Seen in 
this light, the cycles of capitalist boom and bust fuelled by commodity prices strike 
me as more of a continuum than a state change. 
In Colonialism’s Cultures (1994), the historical anthropologist Nicholas 
Thomas set out a postcolonial programme for a comparative study of colonialism – or 
more precisely its cultures – exhorting colleagues to examine comparatively the 
entanglement of colonial cultures, taking coloniser and colonised, not as essentialist 
foundational categories, but as products of asymmetric power and exchange.12 At a 
time when teaching postcolonial approaches to the history of science was scarcely in 
demand, Thomas’ work was important as part of a postcolonial ferment: he brought 
together the work of Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and the literary historian of travel 
literature and romanticism Nigel Leask. Similarly, postcolonial writing and criticism 
was much less present in the Arctic around the 1990s than in Pacific and Latin 
American studies.13 Important and ground-breaking strands of postcolonial literary 
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criticism would look north: in Canada, Rudy Wiebe and Sherrill Grace would write 
against the grain of exploration narratives, deconstructing assumed truths about 
images of nordicity, frontier and masculinity, creating a new if controversial critical 
space for other narrative traditions. Meanwhile, in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, 
feminist and postcolonial scholars began their own interrogations of expansion and 
dispossession along the nation’s cherished northern peripheries, currents of criticism 
which are very much alive today. Many of these scholarly works were grounded in 
their respective authors’ personal experiences of the contradictions within northern 
national traditions, even as they drew inspiration from intellectual allies further 
afield. I had witnessed the racism and dislocation of settler-indigenous life myself in 
Canada’s High Arctic in the 1980s, but discovered the postcolonial tools to open up 
the transregional contexts of colonialism and transculturation in the work of literary 
historians like Mary-Louise Pratt, anthropologists such as Inga Clendinnen and 
Marshal Sahlins, and indigenous leaders, though many were not necessarily aligned 
to, or even compatible with, postcolonial analysis.  
In this context, we might wish to challenge one reading of the current Arctic 
paradigm shift as a new era in which the Arctic is engaging with the rest of the globe. 
Northern peoples, both indigenous and settler, have been making themselves 
knowledgeable about the world and engaging with it for a very long time. So this is 
not a story marked by a trajectory from a parochial north, or a region of wilderness, to 
a cosmopolitan global. The field of postcolonial literature has taught us to attend to 
the narrative strategies that produce cosmopolitan authorship and authority. And yet 
the recent publishing boom of books and articles on the globalisation of the Arctic, 
led largely by political and legal analysis, much less so by the humanities or social 
sciences, draws us back to an understanding of the history and legacy of nearly 500 
years of Arctic colonialisms, an area of enquiry manifestly excluded from current 
mainstream political analysis of the Arctic, and absent from far too much of the 
academic analysis as well. This is particularly worrying when one considers that one 
of the main achievements of indigenous political international movements since the 
1960s has been to acquire political representation, to demand universal suffrage and 
to resist coercion. As many Inuit have told me personally (I paraphrase): ‘our parents 
didn’t know that they could say no to the white man. It didn’t occur to them. Our 
generation discovered that we could say no, that we have rights and can fight against 
injustice.’ With states reasserting their authority over territory in the Arctic today, the 
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politicisation of indigenous consent constantly risks being coopted by the eight Arctic 
member states, as well as the EU. The new Asian observer states are not doing this—
at least not yet. The political geography of Arctic orientalism is still unfolding. 
Today, the importance of indigenous knowledge and self-determination are 
asserted in a range of settings that, only a few decades ago, were unimaginable 
dreams to all but a few visionaries. Land rights negotiations have transformed historic 
aboriginal title into a number of different structures of ownership recognised by 
national or western courts of law – and at quite a price in terms of title surrendered 
and the largely unequal, asymmetric terms of negotiation in these people-to-people 
negotiations. The importance of indigenous knowledge is written into the Arctic 
Council’s Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, but when and how it counts is largely 
unspecified. Indigenous native corporations hold a wide range of assets invested in 
some cases close to home, and in others, in distant global markets.14 The relationship 
between new forms of property rights and regulations means that in some parts of the 
Arctic, indigenous capital has been unshackled and can be more freely invested, but 
this in turn raises important questions about indigenous financial oversight and 
accountability – subjects that leaders and researchers have been shy to address. The 
many different models and provisions of self-government amongst, say, Evenki, 
Sami, Inuit, Gwitchin, Athapaskans, Inuvialuit and Yupik present a picture of great 
contrasts and enormous achievements, but with inequalities infused in this diversity. 
Arctic scholars still struggle to formulate an integrated picture of the political and 
cultural terrain of the region’s peoples because it is so varied. This is dangerous when 
the mobility of global capital is at its most volatile and potentially destructive. 
 
Agency, shames and paralysis 
There is of course an elephant in the room, and that elephant is climate change. Its 
impact on Arctic ecosystems is profound and has been well documented by many 
researchers in the social and natural sciences through the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (2004-5) and many other studies.15 At a time when Arctic researchers 
face growing funding pressures, particularly where fieldwork is involved—
notwithstanding Britain’s plans to build a new oceanographic polar research vessel—
it is important to acknowledge the importance of this research, and the complex body 
of reliable evidence to which it contributes. Climate change is repeatedly 
demonstrated to be impacting on the ecosystems supporting both humans and non-
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human communities. Sea ice melt is one of the most important phenomena of climate 
change, but it is part of a larger eco-political constellation of forces and interactions 
that is now loosely being labeled ‘the Anthropocene’..16  
Postcolonial analysis of Arctic climate has probed climate change narratives 
to explore and reveal how the agency of northern peoples and environments is being 
marshaled to invoke different readings of a cosmopolitan regional citizenship, with 
important recent work on history of circumpolarity, indigenous citizenship and global 
climate citizenship.17 There is much work still to be done to understand how different 
notions of citizenship are imagined, performed, and put to work. Beyond 
understanding social identity per se, postcolonial analysis, I would argue, is in a 
privileged position to explore the social and political implications of the Arctic being 
increasingly identified and appropriated as a set of resources. The very term 
‘resource’ is bound up in competing understandings: energy security, common 
heritage of mankind, freedom of navigation, environmental activism. The tensions 
inherent in the values underlying these narrative frames represent a struggle by 
global-scale networks to redefine and arrange the boundaries of the Arctic itself into a 
new hierarchical spatial order. A range of powerful interests are currently seeking to 
establish conditions of regulatory stability and security so that their activities can be 
planned over time scales appropriate for recovering a medium to long term return on 
large-scale investments. Some northern constituencies are well served by being 
enrolled in global networks and have for some time been important actors in these 
networks. Consider, for example, the legislature and senators of Alaska; or the Arctic 
Council, which employs dialogue and research to help mediate between the interests 
of northern states, transnational indigenous groups and external actors.  
If we follow the example of ANT (actor-network theory) from Latour and 
Callon, we can also begin to see how migrating Arctic fish stocks, seal populations, 
sea ice, contaminants and the aesthetics of landscape are also important actants or 
non-human actors in the reordering of Arctic spaces.18 None of this is adequately 
described by the claim that the Arctic is undergoing a major ‘state change’. Again, it 
is scholarship from the humanities by Steve Shapin and Simon Schaffer that has 
reminded us that the term ‘state’ is value-laden. In the early years of the Royal 
Society, ‘state’ was as much a claim about how a particular social stratum of 
gentlemen could secure social order as it was an argument about why this specific 
group should be trusted to judge experiments about nature.19 Likewise, I would argue 
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that the reworking of northern spaces today, in terms of, e.g. the negotiation of 
resource extraction leases, environmental assessment legislation, and political 
devolution and centralisation (simultaneously in Greenland), amounts to nothing less 
than new configurations of governmentality to continue the redefinition of relations 
of class, labour, exchange and indigeneity in the perpetual tension between homeland 
and frontier capitalism. This analysis is not merely academic in the pejorative sense 
of the term. Rather, it speaks to Alun Anderson’s big question: When the ice is gone, 
commodity prices have fallen, and the corporations have gone, will northern states 
have ensured that their people have been true beneficiaries, or will the Arctic more 
closely resemble the abandoned sites marked by loss of biodiversity and 
contamination in so many other parts of the world?20 Perhaps we are now entering an 
era in which a new social and spatial order might not only be described as a ‘neo-
colonial Arctic’, but as the ‘post-Arctic’, a rhetoric of international solidarity that is 
torn away from the social and material ontologies on which the idea of a circumpolar 
Arctic has been predicated for the last two and a half decades. As postcolonial 
scholars, how do we get the measure of narratives of international cooperation that 
were once the hallmark of indigenous solidarity and connectedness whilst also being 
the telltale signs of what David Harvey and others have shown to be the flattening 
language of global capital operating at the margin? How do we find a critical distance 
from which to see how Edenic narratives and aesthetics about the Arctic are used to 
justify unprecedented securitisation and oversight that take so much and give so little 
back to the north? And how do we do this without diving head first into a twenty-first 
century orientalism that targets the foreign investment and shipping industries of 
eastern Asian states as the culprits for spoiling the planet’s frozen Edenic heritage? 
Still other questions emerge. Can we as a community of scholars construct a 
shared analysis of the Arctic that doesn’t follow the pathways of capital in smoothing 
out all its differences, masking the historical contradictions and injustices that have 
been inherent in the different models of northern nation-building? In order to make 
wise choices in the Anthropocene, is it necessary that we close ranks to avoid 
difficult issues like our oil and mineral dependence, the offshoring of sovereign 
wealth funds, and double standards in labour conditions? I don’t think so. Latour has 
argued that whereas, when we imagined ourselves as modern, we were overawed by 
nature, now that we understand the extraordinary power of the human collective over 
nature, we have moved from one form of paralysis to another.21 This is closely linked 
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to the relationships between new and old colonialisms, between colonising others and 
decolonising ourselves. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this article, I have presented an account of the consequence of representing the 
Arctic today in terms of a ‘state change’. Not long ago Arctic states exhibited such 
hubris towards their minorities that state officials found it difficult to envisage 
alternatives to their own governmentality, arguably because of their unwillingness to 
acknowledge historic injustices. Some of the worst excesses, such as sending 
indigenous children to residential schools, have been brought out into the open, 
whilst other outrages such as the thousands of aboriginal women in Canada who have 
‘disappeared’ are only just surfacing. But citizens and their elected officials are easily 
paralysed by shame, leading them to seek what I would call ‘narratives of 
consolation’. In that context, northern homelands are constantly being re-
mythologised. 
The power of postcolonial methodologies is that they offer real hope that we 
can begin to decolonise ourselves. The postcolonial dividend is that an investment in 
transnational conversations becomes a fundamental context for puncturing the myths 
of Arctic exceptionalism that thrive in the gardens of privileged nations where, in 
truth the introspective gaze tends to be highly disciplined and restrictive. Consider the 
long history of lost Edens in Scandinavia: Linnaeus transplanting and acclimatising 
plants to restore Sweden’s lost Baltic empire; the romantic histories of Nordenskjold 
and Nansen lifting the veils in search of Norden’s deep past; the insistence of 
metropolitan citizens to subscribe to an essentialist notion of indigenous ethnicity 
through the lens of subsistence and lost freedoms rather than the complex pathways 
to urban and rural livelihoods, with and without reindeer; a ‘right to narrative’ that 
ordinary citizens who fancy themselves as cosmopolitan, never fail to reserve for 
themselves. Consider also exploring selves; interrogating one’s own personal history; 
recognizing that as research scholars we are always in the process of becoming 
someone or something changed from what and where we have begun. These are not 
easy tasks. They are filled with uncertainties and offer no guarantees in return. But 
they do offer a shared social space in which we can learn from each other and change 
lives. 
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